KOA - 北朝鮮帰国事業・拉致問題・北朝鮮人権改善NGO「モドゥモイジャ」
01
02
03
04
05
06
Remedies apply

















Remedies apply

KOA » Remedies apply » Remedies apply
Petition for Protecting Human Rights

January 15, 2015


Human Rights Protection Committee

Japan Federation of Bar Associations

Petitioners
Eiko Kawasaki and 11 other people
Indication of Petitioners
Set forth in the Appendix
Attorneys for Petitioners
Set forth in the Appendix

Set forth in the Appendix

Respondents
Japan
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
General Association of Korean Residents in Japan
Japanese Red Cross Society
Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
International Committee of the Red Cross


Purpose of Petition


We request the Respondents to take immediate actions to protect the rights of the Japanese and non-Japanese returnees who migrated to, and still remain in, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) through the Repatriation Program for Korean residents in Japan that began in 1959. We have created the following recommendations:


IJapan


1 To investigate non-Japanese returnees’ names, addresses, family members, places of origin, age and whether they wish to travel to Japan, independently of the DPRK government, in addition to the investigation concerning the Japanese returnees which still has not been realized, and is a matter to be negotiated. For this purpose, the Japanese government should promptly decide and express its committement and make its best effort towards this investigation.

2 To ensure the non-Japanese returnees have freedom of movement between Japan and the DPRK, including families of the non-Japanese and Japanese returnees, should they wish to travel to Japan. For this purpose, the Japanese government is to promptly decide and express its committement and make its best effort.

3 To request the DPRK government for cooperation in order to realize the investigation of the aforementioned matters and freedom of movement between Japan and the DPRK, and to negotiate concrete matters such as the ways, means and timeframe of the investigation as well as the concrete ways and timeframe to realize freedom of movement.

4 To provide the non-Japanese returnees with appropriate means and financial assistance to realize their right to travel to Japan.

5 To discuss with the DPRK government in order to protect all human rights and maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living for all returnees living in the DPRK, including those who wish to travel to Japan.
6 To establish an investigative committee in the National Diet or other appropriate organization to investigate the causes of human rights violations associated with the Repatriation Program and the contents of the remedies provided by each of the Respondents, as well as to evaluate their outcomes and investigate/recommend the compensation of the victims.


II The DPRK government

1 To allow Japanese and non-Japanese returnees to enjoy their freedom of movement including the freedom to travel to Japan.

2 To start a sincere discussion with the Japanese government in order to realize the investigation and the freedom stated in the above I(1) and (2), and to conduct a comprehensive investigation, aimed to design and execute policies for free movement, in close association with the Japanese government.

3 To provide full cooperation to uncover the human rights violations in relation to the Repatriation Program, including cooperating with the Investigation Committee in the Diet, and to follow the advice sincerely with cooperation for its implementation.


III The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, the Japanese Red Cross Society , the Red Cross Society of the DPRK, and the International Committee of the Red Cross

1 To strongly urge the Japanese government and the DPRK government to discuss sincerely in order to realize the investigation and the freedom of movement as stated in the above I(1) and (2), and to cooperate with the DPRK government so that it can conduct a comprehensive investigation and design/implement policies for free movement between Japan and the DPRK.

2 To cooperate for finding out the truth of the human rights violations in relation to the Repatriation Program including the full cooperation with the Investigation Committee in the Diet, and to follow the advice sincerely and with cooperation for its implementation.


Reason of Petition


IOutline of the Petition

From 1959 until 1984, the total number of 90,000 people have migrated to North Korea through the Repatriation Program of Korean residents in Japan. At that time, the DPRK was advertised as licensed as patriots. Among these “only Japanese returnees, including the spouses of non-Japanese returnees, were the object of the investigation in the Agreement between Japan and North Korea of 29 May 2014 (Ko 12). This Agreement represents an important progress, but it was too late to start the investigation of Returned Japanese more than 50 years after the launch of the Repatriation Program.

However, it is obvious that non-Japanese returnees, who followed the same miserable fate and are still suffering from human rights violations, are in urgent need of solutions.

In addition, the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights which was chaired by Michael Kirby, a former judge of the Australian Supreme Court for almost 50 years, released the report in 2014 which was supported by the overwhelming majority of the UN Human Rights Council and the UN General Assembly, (including the Japanese government), in which the DPRK council, including the Repatriation Program, were recognized as programs against humanity.

Therefore, we have submitted this Petition to request the Respondents to investigate the current situation, to realize freedom of movement and to protect human rights for all returnees, including non-Japanese returnees who were excluded from the scope of the 2014 Agreement between Japan and North Korea.


II History of Petition

1 Outline of Repatriation Program of Korean residents in Japan
In 13 February 1953, with the Cabinet Approval (Ko 5, p39), the Shinsuke Kishi administration decided to officially execute the Repatriation Program. Following this Approval, in August 1953, the Japanese Red Cross Society and the DPRK Red Cross Society entered the process of the Repatriation of Korean residents in Japan between the Red Cross Society of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Japanese Red Cross Society (Return Agreement) (Ko 5, p39-p41) and officially began the repatriation program in December of 1953. The Repatriation Program was renewed on an annual basis and continued until the end of 1967. After an interruption during three years, the Program restarted based on the “the mutual agreement of interim relating to the return of the unfinished returnees”

In this way, 93,340 people migrated to North Korea from December 1959 until July 1984. Among them, Japanese nationals were about 6,800 (and 7 Chinese nationals) (Ko 4, p1; Ko 5, p50)


2 Background of the repatriation (Ko 14)

(1) Problems regarding the Korean residents in Japan after the restoration of Japanese sovereignty
Entering into the San Francisco Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952, Japan restored its sovereignty and officially became an independent State. On the other hand, this has had a particular effect for the Korean community in Japan. As the Treaty entered into force, the Korean residents were stripped of their Japanese nationality and were registered as foreigners. Since then, the Japanese government consistently pursued a policy to make them return home as a principle, and then to enhance the control over those who remained in Japan.

In the background of this policy, the Japanese government was cautious about the movement of Korean residents in Japan. The United Democratic Front of Korean residents in Japan was established under the Japanese Communist Party task force on ethnicity (Democratic Front in Japan). It aimed to improve the internal politics of Japan, while demanding the right to a decent living as a “living rights of Korean residents in Japan.” The United Democratic Korean residents in Japan drafted in May 1952, the contents of which included the immediate ceasefire of Korean War; a firm opposition to Japan’s remilitarization, emperor system, and conclusion of a separate peace treaty between North and South Koreas, etc.; the establishment of a democratic government in Japan; friendship between Japan and North Korea; the abolition of the Immigration Control Order; the right to freedom of movement and permanent residency; and the desegregation of the social security system.

Given that the aforementioned demands interfered with Japan and North Korea; the treaty was set forth in Japan. The United the Democratic Front in Japan was targeted by the public security investigation, and many were arrested. (Ko 2, p66-p67).


(2) Demand for travel to North Korea
As the Japanese foreign ministry stated (Ko 2, p66-p67) accompanying the involvement in 1953 when the Armistice Agreement of Korean War was concluded the established Armistice Agreement between Japanese government authorities recognized the matter of the repatriation of Korean residents to the DPRK (Ko 5, p113).

Those who wished to return to the northern part of the Korean Peninsula had existed before the Korean War, and most of them were unable to return, leaving the issue unresolved. After the War, 1,400,000 Korean residents in Japan repatriated to the Korean Peninsula until March 1946. The Japanese government had the Korean residents register as to whether they wished to repatriate; 514,006 people wished to repatriate among the whole 647,006 Korean residents in Japan. 9701 of them wished to migrate to the northern side of the 38th parallel north (Ko 4, p21). However, the US and Soviet Union entered into an agreement in November 1946, which caused a restriction by place of birth. Furthermore, only 351 people actually returned home because the transportation plan was halted due to the Korean War. Since the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War entered into force on 27 July 1953, the issue of repatriation reemerged (Ko 2, p69-p70).


(3) The Establishment of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Ko 2, p76-p77)
An event in May 1955 changed the repatriation movement by Korean residents in Japan. The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (referred to as ted in November 1946, which caused a restriction in repatriation movement which drastically changed.)

Until then, the repatriation movement was positioned as one of “the demands for rights accompanying those who want to return home” (referred to as in The Public Statement in December 1954) stated “those who want to return home should be assisted in their repatriation to ensure democratic rights and the freedom to travel”.

The establishment of GAKR led the repatriation movement to change. The GAKR set forth in its principles: to protect democratic rights and democratic education as public citizens of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and to follow the foreign policies faithfully recreating the peaceful coexistence of the homeland , and to strengthen its characteristic as a diplomatic office of the DPRK. In addition, it reinforced its homeland orientation, as demonstrated in its slogan: “Let all Korean Residents in Japan reunite in the Democratic Peoples in Japan.”


(4) The Expansion of the repatriation movement, increase of people who wish to repatriate, and the cabinet approval Kim Il-sung announced the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan and ensure all conditions for the peaceful coexistence of the homeland Rep the establishment of the DPRK on 8 September 1958 (Ko 17). Furthermore, in the statements by Foreign Minister Num Il on 16 September (Ko 18) and by Deputy Prime Minister Kim Il on 16 October (Ko 19), the DRPK Government requested the Japanese government to take actions necessary for the repatriation, stating that the DPRK government would bear all expenses associated with the repatriation and was ready to provide repatriation ships. In addition, Kim Il Sung explained in detail social security plans after the repatriation and stated that they were prepared to accommodate the returnees in factories, companies, farms and fishing villages in North Korea. In response to this welcoming attitude of the DPRK, the repatriation movement of the GAKR expanded rapidly and it repeatedly requested the Japanese government to realize the repatriation (Ko 4, p93-p95).

The number of people who wished to repatriate increased significantly. The number of such people was fewer than 10,000 until the year 1957, then, after the enlargement of the repatriation movement in the summer 1958, a total 17,130 people wished to repatriate as of 5 October 1958 and 117,000 people at the end of January 1959. The GAKR announced 100,000 increase during these short four months (Ko 4, p98-p99)

Besides the large repatriation movement organized by the GAKR, Japanese people intensified activities of the repatriation movement. Among political parties, the Japanese Communist Party and the Japan Socialist Party positively supported the movement. Furthermore, the “Association for the Repatriation of Korean Residents in Japan, engaged in activities encouraging powerful politicians as well as notable public figures to join in, came into existence and it requested the Japanese government to recognize the repatriation.

Against this background, the Kishi administration and the Japanese government decided to execute the Repatriation Program to North Korea in the existence and relating to the treatment of those who wished to repatriate to the DPRK on 13 February 1959 (Ko 2, p89-92; Ko 5, p39). The Agreement relating to the return home of North Korean residents in Japan between the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea an “Agreement was concluded on 13 August 1959 which allowed the repatriation based on the free will of Korean residents in Japan (Ko 5, p339-p341).” At first, the period was one year and three months, set forth in Article 9 in the Agreement, but the Repatriation Program continued for one decade starting from No. 1 ship on 14 December 1959 to No.187 ship in 1984 (Ko 4, p41).


III The Responsibility of the Respondents


1 The Involvement of the Japanese government
In response to the public opinion, the Japanese government approved the execution of the Repatriation Program to North Korea (Ko 5, p39). In this cabinet approval, it was decided that it was based on the international norm of the approved execution of the Repatriation Program to North Korea (International Committee of the Red Cross) and that the Japanese Government did not need to provide the return ships (Ko 6, p244)

According to the Japanese foreign ministry documents, although the Japanese government was hesitant to implement the Repatriation Program due to its relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK), it decided for the following reasons (Ko 4, p102-p105):

  • i The opinion of the general public as well as the governing party that those who wished to repatriate should be able to repatriate, due to the reasons of public order problems in association with the repatriation movement, a high crime rate of Korean residents, and a high number of welfare recipient families among them.
  • ii “Political disruption of deception” of the DPRK and political groups of leftism by admitting the repatriation.
  • iii It was difficult to agree with the ROK about the issues of “Lee Linee, fishery and repatriation.”
  • iv It was appropriate to eliminate the admitting the nts, although north korea (Ko 5, p39). In this cabinet approval, it was by executing the Repatriation Program during the recess of the conference between Japan and the ROK.

At that time, the Japanese government requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to mediate and verify their will to repatriate.

Formally, all activities relating to the repatriation were delegated to the Japanese Red Cross Society and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Japanese government literally “gave a consent” to concretize the intervention by the International Committee of the Red Cross so as to deviate any opposition by the ROK (Ko 8, p160-p161).


2 The involvement of the DPRK government and the GAKR (Ko 14)


(1) The scenario of the DRPK government and enlargement of the repatriation movement
At the beginning, the repatriation movement of the GAKR was small as it was used as a means to promote policies against Japan and the ROK. The promotion for the returnees was never exaggerated. The DPRK did not center the repatriation program in its policies. The supposed returnees were limited to 1) students in the DPRK; 2) those who wished to repatriate and were imprisoned in the Omura prison where Korean residents in Japan were imprisoned; 3) general fellow Koreans who wished to repatriate “for certain reasons”

However, the repatriation movement of the GAKR was enlarged after 1958. The affiliate of GAKR in Kawasaki held “8.15 Memorial Gathering” on 1 August 1958. The participants made a decision to promote the repatriation, requesting the Japanese government for its rapid realization, because they could not foresee living in Japan nor did they have a choice but to repatriate. The Central permanent committee of the GAKR decided on a collective repatriation policy and requested the Japanese government for immediate actions on 13 August 1958. Gatherings held at each place adopted a decision on the collective repatriation. After the decision of Kawasaki affiliate (Churyu Decision), the GAKR made a large movement which was clearly different from the previous repatriation movement. In the background of the enlargement, there were a scenario and undercover work developed by the leadership of the DPRK. One month before the Churyu Decision, Kim Il-Sung met Perishenko, an interim in charge of affairs between the Soviet Union in the DPRK, and he confessed his policy of promoting a large-scale repatriation plan, with a view to returning all Korean residents in Japan as well as for the purpose of political and economic benefits.

In addition, Kim Il-Sung stated old political and economic benefits when meeting Perishenko, and on previous 5 Memorial Gatherings on cabinet approval, it was decided that it , “ ldeGAKR should request the Japanese government and the DPRK government”, after which an announcement by the DPRK followed.

That is to say, Kim Il-Sung and the DPRK leadership pictured the following scenario: they enlarge the repatriation movement by undercover agents who worked for policies against foreign countries and the ROK, make an appearance that the demand for repatriation increased from within the community of Korean residents in Japan, and the DPRK government simply accepts such a demand. In fact, in response to the expansion of the repatriation movement, Kim Il-Sung welcomed the returnees and expressed protection of their life and education on 8 September 1958 (Ko 17). As a result, the repatriation movement was further enlarged. Big and small gatherings relating to the repatriation movement were held nationwide – 8,275 times (more than 285,000 participants). Around this time, advertisements for the DPRK were made in the journals of the GAKR.


(2) The GAKR’s movement to gain returnees
The GAKR worked not only for the repatriation movement but also for pushing people to repatriate, which was disclosed from the announcement of the number of people who wished to repatriate by the GAKR and the announcement of the Foreign Minister of the DPRK government written in the diary of Puzanov, the ambassador to China and the DPRK. The GAKR made those who wished to repatriate sign a prepared form of “repatriation application” and other relevant forms and submit them to the GAKR.

Furthermore, when the number of people who wished to repatriate decreased after 1961, the GAKR developed a systematic movement to encourage people to repatriate. Especially, under the policy of repatriation those who are useful for the economic construction of North Korea, it gathered returnees, organized a returnee group and made them apply to the Japanese Red Cross Society. In this way, the GAKR decided the policies relating to the returnees and, in practice, handled the offer and personal selection of returnees and the order and time of the repatriation.


(3) Forming of will to repatriate by false information Meetings, schools and journals of the GAKR were the main sources for the returnees to get positive information relating to the DPRK. The GAKR, which enlarged the repatriation movement in August 1958, held various scaled meetings nationwide – 19,400 times by the end of the year 1959. In these meetings, the GAKR stated to inform the situation of their homeland through various scaled meetings about the success, hapiness and pride of the homeland. In addition, with respect to the educational policy of ethnic schools, education for social economic construction and for basic producing technology was introduced with the view to repatriating to the DPRK in 1958. It was also decided that fathers and mothers should school, education for social economic construction and for basic producing technology was introduced, with increased the number of returnees among fellow Koreans. The GATR-oriented media also influenced the formation of the will to repatriate. The journal “encouraged paper training of the mothers and parents in North Korea; the Returnees coming from Gaikokubun Shuppansha, 1960, showed “happy life” of the returnees in advance” (Ko 4, p168-p173).

Furthermore, the Central Executive Committee of the GAKR answered, and to realize the repatriation of compatriots in Japan: materials, questions and answers relating to the repatriation”, that in the DPRK “there is an abundance of food” was left over a sufficiently protected for housing, food, clothing and all other necessary material conditioned for the “happy life” of the returnees in advance (Ko 4, p168-p173)basic producing technology was introduced in consideration of repatriation (Ko7, p78-p81).

However, in fact, the ll other necessary material conditioned “happy life” of the returnees in advance (Ko 4, p168-p173) basic producing technology was introduced with the view of the GAKR and their family and students, the celebrities having “useful values” for the DPRK and the returnees having special skills or techniques. On the other hand, houses for those who were located locally were poor. Allocated food was also bad and digested poorly: rice 10%; flour 50%; the rest was black corn from the Soviet Union and a small amount of Kimchi.

Actually, North Korean high-officials admitted that the actual condition of the DPRK had deviated from what was admitted – that locally the documents delivered from the DPRK government to the Soviet Union embassy, it said, food distribution was composed of rice 10%; flour 50%; the rest was black corn from the Soviet Union. The standard distribution of rice to people was made only in PyongYang and just in the 50% scale of the standard quantities. In the rest of the country, corns and flour were distributed. PLE was made only in PyongYang DPRK leadership recognized and distributed. PLE was made only in P, nevertheless, they made false promotion of the production through the GAKR and prompted the repatriation of Korean residents in Japan (Ko 6, p286-p288).


3 The Involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the DRPK


(1) The Involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross
In response to the cabinet approval, the International Committee of the Red Cross received requests from the Japanese government and the Japanese Red Cross Society and decided to cooperate for the Repatriation Program, provided that the Japanese government gave an affirmative answer to the questionnaire from the International Committee of the Red Cross to the Japanese Red Cross Society. The following is a summary of the aforementioned questions:

  • i Whether the Japanese authorities could formally assure that Korean residents in Japan are never sent against their will.
  • ii Whether the Japanese authorities informed objectively all Koreans of the opportunity to express freely their will that they want to repatriate to the DPRK or the ROK or that they want to stay in Japan.
  • iii Whether the Japanese authorities are ready to inform of what happened to the status of those Koreans who chose to stay in Japan.
  • iv Whether the Japanese authorities are ready to take any actions for maintaining order and for registering and boarding a ship in a quiet and peaceful manner.
  • v Whether the applicants of the repatriation can change their will before entering the boarding district, whether the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross can question each individual without any observers and assure if it is a free will or not.
  • vi Whether each Korean individual has an opportunity to talk to the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross who was deployed in Japan.
  • vii Whether the Japanese authorities provide the convenience of technology and expenses necessary for the International Committee of the Red Cross to join the Program.

However, the DPRK government opposed the convenience of the International Committee of the Red Cross. They urged the Japanese government to cancel “Guidance of the repatriation” put out by the Japanese Red Cross Society. The GAKR boycotted the Repatriation Program itself.

As a result, the International Committee of the Red Cross was made to work under the situation they did not have such power as changing the result of affairs. Most of the 22 representatives sent from the International Committee of the Red Cross could not speak Japanese at all and they were few in number for carrying out a transfer of many people. In fact, they had little opportunities to spend time with Koreans (Ko 13, p270-p284).


(2) The involvement of the Japanese Red Cross Society
The reason why the Japanese Red Cross Society was requested to get involved was because the Japanese Red Cross Society was regarded as a communication agency between the two countries, as the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs in Japan stated to the Japanese delegates visiting the DPRK that Vice-Minister from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan and the Japanese Red Cross Society in order to negotiate with the DPRK”. In addition, there was a need for considering the cautiousness of Korean residents in Japan and the reaction of the ROK government and a need of forming that the Japanese government did not take initiative and negotiate.

As a result of this consideration, the Japanese Red Cross Society emerged as an agency in charge of actual affairs (Ko 2, p73).

Furthermore, the DPRK government announced a change of actual affairs (Ko 2, p73), the reaction of visiting result of affairs entities. I16 February 1959, decided to organize an employment, maintaining life and school attendance, and delegated the resolution of the repatriation problem in talks with the Japanese Red Cross Society to the Red Cross Society of the DPRK (Ko 21, p201; Ko 20 ).

At first, the problem was the repatriation of the Japanese who remained in North Korea after the War. In January 1954, the Japanese Red Cross Society requested the Red Cross Society of the DPRK to assist the repatriation of the Japanese, as well as to assist those who wished to repatriate the Korean residents into Japan by using the returning ships.

The Japanese Red Cross Society got in touch with the Red Cross Society of the DPRK in association with the repatriation matter as stated above in late 1955. Under such circumstances, Masutaro Inoue, former ambassador and now Director of foreign affairs of the Japanese Red Cross Society, urged the Red Cross Society of the DPRK in relation to the DPRK repatriation matter. The Japanese Red Cross Society requested the Red Cross Society of the DPRK for interposition to the repatriation matter in December 1955. In the correspondence from Tadatusgu Shimazu, President of the Japanese Red Cross Society to Boissier, Chairman of the International Head of the Red Cross, the repatriation matter did not cause any troubles with the ROK, and if it was executed not by the Red Cross Society of the DPRK but by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Japan would never oppose it and rather have an expectation.

The Japanese government started to move concretely to realize the repatriation to the DPRK for the first time. The International Committee of the Red Cross answered that it would give positive considerations to the Japanese Red Cross Society’s request, sending Far Eastern delegations to Japan, the DPRK and the ROK, from April to June 1956, and collected basic information relating to the Far Eastern humanitarian problems (Ko 6, p231).

In response to the Cabinet Approval of the Japanese government of 13 February 1959, the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the DPRK had a meeting to enter into the Repatriation Agreement for fixing up the contents of the Repatriation Program. However, the meeting proceeded with difficulty, because the DPRK government opposed strongly to the meeting process the Japanese government had preconditioned.

The DPRK Government was scared of the use of repatriation program, the meeting proceeded with that of a decrease in the returnees. On the other hand, the Japanese Red Cross Society promised that the “the ised that society returnees. On the other hand, in consideration of thought, place of birth, with or without of family, experience of the anti-Japanese movement, and with or without criminal records, and voiced that rest was black corns of view of the returnees. b21, p247).

As a result, drafting of the Repatriation Agreement, Appendix and Joint Communique was completed by 24 June 1959 and both representatives of the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the DPRK initiated it on the same day.

The International Committee of the Red Cross voiced for the cooperation with the Repatriation Program in early August 1959, and the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the DPRK entered into the Repatriation Agreement on 13 August 1959. The first repatriation ship left port on 14 December 1959.

The Agreement was subsequently renewed every year until 1967 and finished eight years after the first signing. The small scale of the repatriation had continued until 1984, which was due to the informal agreement with the Japanese Red Cross Society and the Red Cross Society of the DPRK and there was no direct involvement of the International Committee of the Red Cross.


IV Human rights Violations against the returnees including Petitioners, crimes against humanity


1 Human rights violations in the DPRK

The returnees voyaged to the DPRK guided by the advertisement that the DPRK was a Korean voyaged to   ding Petitioners, crimes against humanity he signing(medicine, education, etc.) (Ko 1, p291-p292). However, the real DPRK was filled with human rights violations and was quite different from the view of Petitioners, with crimes against humanity in medicine, education, etc. criminal records, and voiced that the rest was black corns of view system which was never allowed (Ko p45-p46, p62-p67). The national media control information in the DPRK and its outside information cannot enter the country (Ko 1, p54-p62). In addition, the thought of the Leader of the DPRK is the only religion that is allowed to believe in and no other religion is allowed (Ko1, p67-p73). Actually, the thought and expression of the returnees from Japan to the DPRK by the Repatriation Program were strictly watched because they came from Japan (Ko 1, p65). Letters they wrote to their family in Japan were all censored (Ko 1, p291-p292). Also, there was discrimination in the DPRK, therefore, the returnees by Repatriation Program were discriminated incredibly. They were bullied in school, suspected as spies and could not be successful in the workplace (Ko 1, p82-p83). Furthermore, freedom of movement including that of leaving their country and freedom of residence were not respected in the DPRK (Ko1, p143-p144). The DPRK uses food as a control means and infringes rights to food and life and freedom from poverty (Article 13, the Constitution of Japan). It is clear that the returnees were also the victims of human rights violations. The DPRK government drove many people to suicide by infanticide, public execution, violence, intended poverty, etc., which corresponds to homicide (Ko 1, p325, p330-p331). Forced labor being imposed on inmates in political prison camps and general camps corresponds to an act of slavery (Ko 1, p325-p326, p331). In these camps, intended poverty arises by not giving food, and inmates are driven to suicide, which corresponds to an act of annihilation (Ko 1, p323-p325, p330-p331). Inmates in the camps are beaten constantly and are given intolerable pain, which corresponds to torture (Ko 1, p326, p331). Physical restraint in the camps are arbitrary without a court procedure, therefore corresponds to imprisonment (Ko 1, P322-p323, p330).

In addition, sexual violence against women such as rape and forced abortion was widespread in the camps (Ko 1. p327, p331). Especially, in the camps for political prisoners, inmates are never regarded as human beings and all human rights are denied. Being placed in such a situation itself constitutes persecution (Ko 1, p328).

These are part of systematic and extensive attacks against civilians and are serious violations of human rights (Ko 1, p328-p329). Among the returnees from Japan to the DPRK, not a few people were sent to the camps for political prisoners, where serious human rights violations amounting to crimes against humanity are widespread (Ko 1, p346). In view of the above, it is clear that the Petitioners suffered human rights violations because they migrated from Japan to the DPRK through the Repatriation Program.


2 The Repatriation Program as a Violation of human rights (Ko 14)

The DPRK government and the GAKR call themselves together as camps for political people to migrate through the Repatriation Program, advertizing a wealthy life in the DPRK. However, the DPRK was actually filled with human rights violations. The promise of human rights to the camps for political prisoners, where serious violations of human rights in the DPRK through the Repatriation Program to decide to migrate. As soon as the returnees including Petitioners arrived in the Chongjin port, they found that promise to be false. After that, Petitioners encountered an extremely low standard of living; a severe living environment without freedom of expression, assembly or association; a strong mental shock due to lack of education which they were supposed to be accorded; discrimination from local residents in the DPRK; fear of the surveillance of the government; serious poverty in the 90s; fear of the restriction by the Health Department. They had to spend such a miserable life which would have been different from a life if they had remained in Japan (Statements of each Petitioner) (Ko 2, p2-p24)

In addition, petitioners were not sent to the camps for political prisoners, but many among the returnees were sent there. Mr. Kan Chol Hwan, who was born as a child of the returnee from Kyoto and had been imprisoned since the age of 9 for ten years with his whole family at the political prison camp No. 15 control station in Yodoku, gave a testimony in the Commission of Inquiry of the United Nation that the whole section of the camps was filled with the returnees from Japan (Ko 2, p294-p295). The situation was written in detail (Ko 2, p294-p295). That is to say, among the returnees, not a few people had to spend a severe life in the camps of political prisoners in the DPRK. It is not an overstatement to call it “Hell on Earth” and there might be those who are still in the suffering. Of course, Petitioners and many returnees would never have migrated to the DPRK through the Repatriation Program if they had known the reality of the DPRK. The Commission of Inquiry of the United Nation pointed out the deceptiveness of the Repatriation Program as follows:

Starting in 1959, more than 93,000 persons were lured by false promises to migrate from Japan to the DPRK. A few years after their arrival, they were denied to have any contact with the family members they left behind. Many of them, ended up in political prison camps and other places of detention in the DPRK. Among them were also several thousand Japanese nationals who had been expressly promised the right to leave the DPRK.

Such an act of the DPRK constitutes forced disappearance like the DPRK’s abduction of Japanese citizens under international criminal law (Ko 1, p291-p295), and is recognized as a violation of International criminal law (Ko 1, p291-p295), and is recognized by the DPRK. Among them were also several thousand Japanese 5, Rome Statute) by Commission of Inquiry of the United Nation (Ko 1, p345-p346). In other words, the Repatriation Program by the false promises itself amounts to serious violations of human rights. Therefore, in this sense, it is clear that Petitioners are victims of human rights violations.


3 The Respondents’ obligation to act


(1) At the time of the returnees’ arrival in the DPRK, the Respondents knew or should know the DPRK was not a “paradise, and they should not allow Petitioners to repatriate in the first place without removing the Petitioners’ misunderstandings (Ko 12, Ko14)
Although the returnees went to the DPRK because of the promotion as a cause of the Respondents were supposed to know or should have known that the DPRK was not a “paradise in reality.”

Accordingly, the Respondents should have acted and should have prevented the Petitioners repatriate without removing their misunderstandings.

The South Korean media often reported that the reality of the DPRK was far from being a paradise. The returnees appealed in the letter and tried to inform the current situation of their family. The situation spread by word of mouth.

Other than the above, there is evidence that reports on the situations of the DPRK from an independent view in Japan. Examples are as follows:


(A) Seki, Kisei based his views in Japan, and tried to inform the current situation of the DPRK
The book was published from Zenbosha in 1962. Though it was out of print, it was reprinted from Aki Shobo in 1997, which is submitted as Ko 10

Mr. Seki was a member of the Central Finance Committee of the GAKR at the time of publication, and he had been to PyongYang several times during the terms from 1957 to 1960 after the Repatriation Program. The purpose of the voyage in 1960 was to know the situation of the fellow Koreans who repatriate to the DPRK. As a result, he has been North Korea purpose of the voyage in 1960 was to know leadership of the homeland to his compatriots in Japan. The book introduces 20 letters of the returnees and is recognized to be credible evidence.


(B) Kan Koken took a look that introduces 20 letters of the returnees and is recognized to be 1960 after Aki Shobo in 1997, which is s25)
It is a valuable record of a North Korean defector before the end of the Korean War, and is the first record of a defector in the North Korean hierarchy system, written for the first time in Japan. The eighth edition of Ko 11 was published just nine months after the first edition which was indicated a big influence at that time.


(2) At the time of the departure of the first ship, even if the Respondents misunderstood the DPRK as a “North Korea and of Japan Their obligation to allow the Petitioners and others to return to Japan or to freely travel as soon as possible”

If, at the time of the departure of the first ship, the Respondents misunderstood the DPRK as a “the Korea of then Japan”, The eighth edition of a sincere investigation at the time), later, they should be responsible for investigating sincerely or maintaining attention for the fates and situation of the people who migrated to the DPRK through their own involvement.

If the Respondents fulfilled the aforementioned responsibility, they could have known various rescue messages from the returnees, a certain period after arriving at the DPRK in the first ship.

In addition, at that time, various information such as the above messages from the returnees, a certain period after arriving was indicated a big influence at that the fact that the DPRK was far from being a “ever being a serious informant”

Based on the acts for repatriation and the preceding acts of the execution of the repatriation including the verification of will, safeguard the Petitioners from human rights infringements of the rights to maintain the minimum standards of human rights and humane living and rights to recover the current situation (Article 13, the Constitutions) without leaving the returnees in a miserable condition in the DPRK, the obligation to allow the Petitioners return to Japan or freely travel as soon as possible.

In this case, because they migrated to the DPRK from the misunderstanding based on false information, the returnees have the right of restoration, and if the Respondents leave it without performing their obligation, they could have predicted the violations of their life and body and the rights of the living” (Article 13, the Constitutions) in 1962 at the latest.

Furthermore, it was possible for the Respondents to coordinate with related organizations in order to avoid the violations of human rights for the Petitioners and the returnees and ensure their return to Japan and the freedom of movement though it was not easy, therefore, it is recognized that the Respondents had the possibility of avoiding the result.

In this case, different from the abduction matter, the DPRK admitted the existence of the returnees. The Japanese government, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Japanese Red Cross Society and the GAKR can bring all together, and through the sincere talks with the DPRK and political pressures against it, it is possible to make the DPRK accept free movement as a humanitarian measure.

Accordingly, based on the preceding acts the returnees including Petitioners guided to repatriate to the DPRK, the Respondents has the obligation to take actions in order to realize remedies including their return to Japan (free movement), since the time they knew the misunderstanding of the Petitioners promptly, and is obliged to do it even now.

However, the Respondents do not perform their obligations. Therefore, they are in breach of the obligation to act, by neglecting to allow the Petitioners return to Japan and allow their free movement. Later it was found that the DPRK was not just a “paradise” but a cruel state that regularly commits human rights violations. As the cruel reality comes into light, the immediacy of the Respondents’ obligation to relieve Petitioners and take sincere and strong actions promptly is higher than ever.


4 The obligation to protect the Petitioners’ right to reparation

For the victims of serious violations of human rights, they have the right to reparation, as pointed out in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Ko 15), which was adopted by the United Nation General Assembly.

The contents of the rights set forth in this guideline have a number of aspects and of course they includes the right to restoration before the violations were committed (Ko 15, paragraph 19). Accordingly, the victims have the right to restoration before the violations were committed. Therefore, they should be accorded to the right to freedom of movement to Japan, because they were residents of Japan before the repatriation, if they wish.

The victims of the ills of the repatriation movement had to consider the right of family unification. If the returnees remain in the DPRK, they should have the protection of any human rights, and of minimum standard of healthy and cultural living, like in Japan. To realize these rights, first, Japan and the DPRK, themselves are parties of the Repatriation Program, take necessary actions and aid. Furthermore, the GAKR, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Red Cross Society of the DPRK and the International Committee of the Red Cross should urge the Japanese government and the DPRK government to realize such actions and aid, and should cooperate with the the DPRK especially.

Furthermore, according to the Guideline, the following matters are included in the victims and cultural living, like in Japan. Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Ko 15), which was adopted h 20), that government develops a state level program relating to compensations, reparation, and other support in case a responsible person does not or cannot do it.

Therefore, the Japanese government and the Diet should organize an investigative committee to find out the truth and should proceed with the following steps: investigation of the cause of human rights violations associated with the Repatriation Program; investigation of the remedies provided by the Respondents and verification of their effect; investigation and suggestion for compensations for the victims. In addition, the DPRK government, the GAKR, the Japanese Red Cross Society, the Red Cross Society of the DPRK and the International Committee of the Red Cross should cooperate with each other to find out the truth of human rights violations associated with the Repatriation Program including that of the investigation committee in the Diet.

5 Lack of actions of the other parties

However, concerning the remedies related to the Repatriation Program, there is an Agreement between Japan and the DPRK of 29 May 2014 (Ko 9), which only concerns the investigations of the Japanese citizens who migrated from Japan to the DPRK.

Therefore, the Petitioners made this petition as set forth in the Purpose of the Petitions.

Means of Evidence

  • Ko 1 Human Rights Council, mReports of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People living, like in Japan February 7, 2014
  • Ko 2 KUROKAWA Seiko, ko, ed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People living, like in Japan February 7, 2014 Serious Violations of International Humanitar
  • Ko 3 Exclusive ive , ko, ed findings of the cames “Fate of 160 Japanese concerned” (Yomiuri Weekly November 21, 2004 P21)
  • Ko 4 KIKUCHI Yoshiaki, ki, findings of the cames “Fate of 160 Japanese concerned” (Yomiuri Weekly November 21, 200
  • Ko 5 Kim Yong Dal, TAKAYANAGI Toshio edition ion “Fate of 16ng to North Korean return home program” (Shinkansha, 1995)
  • Ko 6 KIKUCHI Yoshiaki aki AGI Toshio edition ion “Fate of 16ng to North Korean return home program” (Shinkansha, 1995)1)n Japan February 7, 2014 Serious Violations of
  • Ko 7 General Association of Korean Residence in Japan, Central Permanent Committee, Promotion Section edition “For realizing return home for the fellows in Japan – Material and Answers relating to the return home matter” (“Hikari Ise” No.2 2008 P76-93)
  • Ko 8 Park JungJin Jin on ofome Program Seen From the International Relationships – mainly about the problem of International Red Cross joining” (What was “return home movement” Heibonsha, 2005)
  • Ko 9 May 29, 2014 announcement: Agreement Documents between Japan and North Korea
  • Ko 10 SEKI Kisei ocuments between Japan and North Koreatween Japan and North Koreaoreai
  • Ko 11 KAN Koken oken ents between Japan and North Koreatween Japan and North Koreaoreainly aboutv
  • Ko 12 Mainichi Shinbun August 4, 2006, Tokyo Evening edition, P1, Politics “North Korea: “Shusshin Seibun” investigation, Japanese Government Grasped in 60s.
  • Ko 13 Tessa Morris-Suzuk, Exodus to North Korea – Tracing shadows of “North Korea: “Shusshin Seibun” investigation
  • Ko 14 Statement (Prof, YAMADA Fumiaki, Osaka University of Economics”
  • Ko 15 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law、 A/RES/60/147
  • Ko 16 Kan Chol Hwan “Aquarium of PyongYang”, (Poplar, 2003)
  • Ko 17 In the Kim Il Sung report of ten-year celebration ceremony of the DPRK (Il Sung report of ten-year celebration ceremonyemonyration for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law an, 1959, P20)
  • Ko 18 Announcement of Foreign Ministry of DPRK (RK (on ceremonyemonyration for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law an, 1959, P2
  • Ko 19 Depty Prime Minister Kim Il, Answer to The Questions of Korean Central News Agency (“The home land waiting! – Literature relating to the return home matters of the fellows in Japan” P22-P26)
  • Ko 20 Telegraph sent from Chairman of Korean Red Cross Committee from President of Japan Red Cross Society (pan Red Cross Society irman ofrature relating to the return home matters of the fellows in Japan” P107-P108)
  • Ko 21 Park JungJin gJin iety irman ofrature relating to the return home matters of the fellows in Japan” P107-P108) –
  • Ko 22 Statement (Petitioner Eiko Kawasaki)
  • Ko 23 ditto (Petitioner Manabu Ishikawa)
  • Ko 24 ditto (Petitioner anonymouse)




TEL: +81-50-1365-5987, FAX: 03-3649-9443 COPYRIGHT © KOA, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. LOGIN